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APARTHEID IN AMERICA: A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 
OF CONTEMPORARY RACIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES. 
By James A. Kushner. Arlington, Va.: Carrolton Press. 1980. Pp. 
187. $12. 
Despite numerous Supreme Court decisions and the civil rights 
legislation of the past decades, residential segregation pervades the 
United States, and the degree of racial separation is increasing. The 
Burger Court has not responded to this challenge with the idealism 
of former Courts. Characteristic of its attitude is Justice Stewart's 
comment that racial isolation stems from "unknown and perhaps un-
knowable causes." 1 Apartheid in America challenges this view from 
an historical and legal perspective and, in the end, rejects it. 
Kushner's book catalogues many of the causes of segregation and 
proposes desegregation remedies. The dialogue it will inspire should 
off er a timely respite from judicial cynicism. 
The first part of the book examines the historical antecedents of 
today's dual society. Its focus is government policy and action, from 
which, Kushner argues, racial isolation has emerged. Kushner starts 
with the nineteenth century, during which blacks resided in a dis-
persed pattern in American cities. In this era Kushner discovers the 
roots of segregation. He finds that the industrial revolution pro-
duced an atmosphere of confrontation among competing laborers. 
Blacks responded to labor tensions with a "self-imposed concentra-
tion" (p. 13). At the same time, public works projects destroyed inte-
grated neighborhoods while the racially restrictive covenant shaped 
resettlement into a segregated pattern. 
Turning to the twentieth century, Kushner indicates a series of 
federal and local policies that accelerated the pace of segregation. 
The federal government facilitated the development of white subur-
bia after World War II through the provision of mortgage financing 
(pp. 21-22) and funds for highways and utilities (p. 23). Local hous-
ing programs increased segregation as municipal authorities pro-
vided blacks with "separate but equal"2 (p. 31), but nonetheless 
cheap, housing (pp. 32-35). Congress's response to urban decay -
its slum clearance and urban renewal programs - ended up contrib-
uting to segregation. Federally f~nded community development ef-
l. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 756 n.2 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
2. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1895) (enunciating "separate but equal" as the four-
teenth amendment tc,st in approving separate railway cars for blacks). 
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forts, for example, sacrificed urban neighborhoods and forced 
displaced persons into racially segregated housing markets (p. 38). 
Even as government programs pushed blacks into ghettos, white sub-
urbs remained segregated through state action and inaction. On the 
one hand, "innovative" zoning ordinances excluded low income 
families from suburbs (pp. 44-50).3 On the other, realtors, uncon-
trolled by state regulators, intentionally excluded blacks from white 
neighborhoods while mortgage bankers "redlined" blacks into isola-
tion (p. 54). Kushner completes his government policy analysis with 
a look at federal and state taxation schemes. He concludes that tax 
policies accelerated suburban plant location and residential develop-
ment and simultaneously eroded the cities' tax base. 
The second part of Apartheid in America analyzes judicial deci-
sions from .Dred Scott4 to Bakke5 and concludes that Supreme Court 
actions have facilitated and legitimized racial segregation. Kushner 
finds the recent decisions in Milliken v. Bradley6 and San Antonio 
School District v. Rodriguez7 more "pernicious" thanPlessy v. Fergu-
son:8 Milliken's refusal to grant inter-district relief, combined with 
San Antonio School .District's approval of the property tax system of 
school financing, has perpetuated separate but "unequal" school sys-
tems (p. 83). Kushner also decries the limited potential of judicial 
remedies to relieve urban segregation. He downplays the Supreme 
Court's approval in Hills v. Gautreaux 9 of an order directing HUD to 
develop lower income housing in Chicago surburbs (p. 85). Desegre-
gation, Kushner argues, requires the absence of traditional land use 
controls (which the courts continue to sustain (pp. 86-90)) and abun-
dant government subsidies (which instead remain meager). 
While Kushner praises the positive effect of "favorable" civil 
rights decisions in the South (p. 94), he bitterly condemns the Court's 
test for equal protection violations which requires plaintiffs to prove 
discriminatory purpose. 10 Kushner criticizes the test as too narrow 
3. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
4. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (blacks held not to be "citizens" and thus 
could not claim any constitutional rights). 
5. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
6. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
7. 411 U.S. I (1973). 
8. 103 U.S. 537 (1895). 
9. 425 U.S. 284 (1976). 
10. Kushner contrasts the standard for constitutional violations with that for violation of 
the Civil Rights Acts. Under the latter, a practice having a disproportionate impact on minori-
ties is invalid unless that impact is justified by rational business necessity. P. 97. See Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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to remedy the "overwhelming majority of acts of racial discrimina-
tion" (p. 102). To prove intent the plaintiff must either demonstrate 
the actor's subjective discriminatory purpose or present evidence of 
conduct that is so outrageous that an inference of discriminatory 
purpose is unavoidable. Kushner would instead predicate liability 
on the "substantial certainty" that discriminatory effect was the "nat-
ural and foreseeable consequence" of the disputed action. He then 
illustrates this "natural and foreseeable consequences with probable 
certainty" test by applying it to zoning statutes (pp. 105-07). 
Unfortunately, the illustration only demonstrates the flaws of the 
test. Kushner uses the "substantial certainty" requirement to qualify 
the "naturaf and foreseeable" standard. He recognizes that his test 
overcompensates for the restrictive Supreme Court approach; he at-
tempts to draw the line between the Supreme Court's subjective in-
tent/ outrageous conduct test and the foreseeability/ disproportionate 
impacts standard by adding "substantial certainty" to the latter. The 
result, says Kushner, is "foreseeability with bite." What Kushner's 
test boils down to, though, is a measurement of the objective 
probability of disproportionate impact. Although Kushner requires 
an awareness that the conduct at issue is substantially certain to have 
discriminatory effect, he is willing to infer such awareness from the 
objective likelihood of impact (p. 106). Such an inference renders 
the "natural and foreseeable" requirement superfluous, since all sub-
stantially certain effects would also be foreseeable. To find the mid-
dle ground, Kushner should have proposed a "substantial certainty" 
test alone. 
Part III reviews various proposals for new legislative and judicial 
remedies for segregation. Kushner urges Congress to extend the 
standard for racial discrimination that now applies under the Civil 
Rights Act to all fourteenth amendment violations. He also believes 
that appropriate legislation could alleviate the discriminatory effects 
of twentieth century federal programs. Finally, Kushner urges the 
Supreme Court to reconsider its interpretations of the fourteenth 
amendment. 
Apartheid in America will disappoint readers who seek an exclu-
sively legal analysis of residential segregation. To those who want to 
revive congressional initiative and Supreme Court idealism, how-
ever, Kushner's book is an interdisciplinary invitation to reevaluate 
the causes of segregation and the nation's failure to end it. 
